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NOTES
The Keiretsu Distribution System of
Japan: Its Steadfast Existence Despite
Heightened Foreign and Domestic
Pressure for Dissolution
Gregory K Bader*
Introduction
In stark contrast to the United States, Japan openly encouraged monopo-
lies in its economy prior to World War 11.1 After the War, however, Japan
enacted antimonopoly legislation during its occupation by Allied forces.
2
This legislation dramatically reversed Japanese economic policy and
resulted in more competitive Japanese markets. Despite this statutory
reversal, however, Japan's enforcement of its antimonopoly policy remains
inadequate by U.S. standards,3 especially in regard to the Japanese corpo-
rate phenomenon known as the keiretsI
4
Each keiretsu is a transparent network of related companies that cen-
ters around a large trading company or bank, effectively interlinking
whole sections of the Japanese economy.5 In essence, the keiretsu "exist
not as formal organizations in the legal world but as loosely organized
* J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 1994; B.A., University of California, Irvine,
1991.
1. See THOMAS A. BiSSON, ZAIBATSU DIssoLUTIoN IN JAPAN 28-25 (1976).
2. HIROSHI IYo~i & AMNORI UESUcG, THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS OF JAPAN 31-32
(1983).
3. See generally Senior U.S. Trade Official Blasts Tokyo for Slow Trade Action, KYODO
NEmvs, Jan. 12, 1994, available in WESTLAW, JAPANECON database. See also Phase IH
Japan's Distribution System and Options for Improving U.S. Access, USLTC Publication 2327,
Repot to the House Committee on Ways and Means, Oct. 1990, available in WESTLAW,
FINT-ITC database [hereinafter Phase I1].
4. ELEANOR M. HADLEY, ANTrrRusr IN JAPAN 257 (1970). The term "keiretsu," as
defined by its component parts, means a "lineage, faction, group ... arranged in
order." Id. Examples include present day Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo. Id.
5. Id.
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alliances within the social world of the [Japanese] business community."6
At the most benign level, the keiretsu attempt to gain monopoly power in
markets to benefit from economies of scale.7 At a more malevolent level,
many keiretsu use their collective power to impede international trade flow-
ing into Japanese markets by favoring transactions with other members of
their own group.8 In addition, some keiretsu allegedly engage in interna-
tional predatory pricing schemes that drive competitors out of markets,
thereby allowing these keiretsu to establish monopolies and subsequently
reap the benefits of higher prices.9
The United States, in response to keiretsu activities and other struc-
tural barriers to trade, launched the United States-Japan Structural Imped-
iments Initiative (SII) in 1989.10 The Bush administration targeted the
keiretsu as a significant trade barrier and pressed the Japanese to enforce
their antimonopoly laws against these groups.1 Although the Japanese
formally acceded to U.S. demands, this agreement remains largely unen-
forced.' 2 Nevertheless, the United States continues to challenge the
keiretsu through Si's successor, the Clinton administration's bilateral trade
negotiation framework.'8
This Note focuses on the historical formation of present day keiretsu
groups in part I and examines the cohesive elements of keiretsu behavior in
6. MICHAEL L. GERLACH, THm KEIRETsu: A PRIMER 8 (1992).
7. K. BIEDA, THE STRucTURE AND OPERATION OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 210
(1970). See also Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1964) (testimony by
Professor Corwin D. Edwards). Professor Edwards testified that:
A big firm has advantages over a smaller rival just because it is big. Money is
power. A big firm can outbid, outspend, and outlose a small firm. It can adver-
tise more intensively, do more intensive and extensive research, buy up inven-
tions of others, defend its legal rights or alleged rights more thoroughly, bid
higher for scarce resources, acquire the best locations and the best technicians
and executives. If it overdoes its expenditures, it can absorb losses that would
bankrupt a small rival.
8. Kozo Yamamura & Jan Vandenberg, Japan's Rapid-Growth Policy on Triak The
Television Case in L-w AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 238, 245-47 (Gary
Saxonhouse & Kozo Yamamura eds., 1986).
9. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The
plaintiffs in Matsushita claimed that 21 Japanese corporations were involved in a preda-
tory pricing scheme that set television prices below their fair market value in the United
States while recouping losses with higher prices in Japan. Id. at 577-78. Plaintiffs
alleged that these 21 corporations intended to drive American competitors out of busi-
ness so the Japanese corporations could increase their market share and take over the
U.S. television industry. Id. at 575. The Court found the alleged scheme too complex
to maintain. In arriving at this conclusion, however, it virtually ignored the ineffective
enforcement of Japan's antimonopoly policy, the long-run approach ofJapanese busi-
nesses, and the monopolistic policies of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI). See discussion of MITI, infra part III.A.
10. United States-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative: Hearings Before the Senate Sub-
comm. on International Trade of the Comm. on Finance 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1-2
(1992).
11. Id. at 2.
12. Phase If, supra note 3.
13. SeeJapan-U.S. Trade Framework Talks to Start Sept. 10, KYODo NEws, Aug. 20, 1993,
available in WESTLAW, JAPANECON database.
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part II. Part III discusses conflicting Japanese governmental policies that
affect keiretsu relationships, the antagonistic roles of the Ministry of Inter-
national Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Japanese Fair Trade Commis-
sion (JFTC), and the inadequacies and directives of the JFTC that support
keiretsu activities. Part IV analyzes international challenges to the keiretsu,
who act as nontariff barriers to foreign trade entering Japan. This part
discusses the Bush administration's Structural Impediments Initiative, the
Clinton administration's bilateral trade negotiation framework, and the
Super 301 provision of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act.
Part V addresses further actions needed to remedy the keiretsu dilemma.
This Note concludes that the keiretsu function as structural and sectoral
barriers to trade enteringJapanese markets, that they eliminate the benefi-
cial effects of competitive markets in favor of monopolistic power, and that
they violate Japan's antimonopoly laws. Japan, therefore, must dismantle
the keiretsu groups into individual competitive companies that comply with
Japan's Antimonopoly Act.
I. Historical Background-The Formation of Present Day Keiretsu
The historical and cultural development of the keiretsu over the past cen-
tury provides a basis for understanding and challenging the keiretsu of
today. Prior to World War II, imperial Japan promoted the existence of
large scale monopolies known as zaibatsu.14 These monopolies consisted
primarily of four structural levels: the zaibatsu family, the central holding
company, the greater operational subsidiaries, and the lesser subsidiar-
ies.15 Through this elaborate structure, the zaibatsu asserted monopolistic
control over whole sections of industry and used their strong financial
positions to keep out smaller competitors in furtherance of their monopo-
listic power.' 6
In addition, Japan's Imperial Government encouraged and supported
the zaibatsu, such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi.' 7 In fact, strong ties existed
between these zaibatsu and the Meii royal family, and each benefitted
respectively.' 8 The royal family and Japan itself benefitted from strong
multinational corporations expanding into the international market-
14. HADLEY, supra note 4, at 40. The term "zaibatsu," as defined by its component
parts, means a "wealth ... estate, group, clique." Id. It denotes large corporate monop-
olies composed of a central holding company or bank that directs smaller diversified
companies thereby monopolizing whole sections of the economy. Id. Examples
include pre-World War II Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo. Id. The Mitsui zaibatsu
was the largest of the zaibatsu and was only rivaled in power and size by a relative new-
comer, the Mitsubishi zaibatsu. JoHN G. ROBERTS, Mrrsui 119 (2d ed. 1989). Through-
out the history of the two conglomerates, the competition between them has been
fierce and continues to this day. Id.
15. G.C. ALLEN, THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 125 (1981); BISSON, supra note 1, at 24.
16. BTsson, supra note 1, at 24-26.
17. Id. at 36-37.
18. For example, the Mitsui zaibatsu was controlled by the Mitsui family for over 270
years and had beneficial marital links to the Meiji royal family. ROBERTS, supra note 14,
at 224-25.
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place. 19 The zaibatsu, in return, benefitted from supportive legislation
and royal favors.20 In essence, this system advanced the interests of
Japan's elite and the goals of the Japanese nation at the expense of fair
trade and to the detriment of foreign and smaller domestic competitors.
The zaibatsu, however, experienced a dramatic reversal in policy dur-
ing the American occupation following Japan's defeat in World War 11.21
The monopolistic nature of the zaibatsu directly conflicted with the U.S.
policy of competitive markets, and the United States consequently initi-
ated their dissolution.2 2 The United States accomplished this by dissolv-
ing "large industrial and banking combines" through Japan's Holding
Company Liquidation Commission (HCLC). 23 Although the Japanese
government officially created and staffed the HCLC, General MacArthur,
the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), conceptualized and
influenced the HCLC's formation. 24 Under SCAP's direction, Japan
empowered the HCLC to dissolve combines in accordance with the newly
enacted Deconcentration Act 25 and Antimonopoly Act.26
The Deconcentration Act reflected American economic values.27 It
encouraged more competitive Japanese markets and provided greater
opportunity for outsiders to enter markets by giving the HCLC the power
to reorganize the zaibatsu into smaller, individual corporations. 28 TheJap-
19. IvoRu & UESUGI, supra note 2, at 2. Examples of other zaibatsu multinational
corporations include Sumitomo, Yasuda, Asano, Furukawa, Kawasaki, Otani, and
Okura. ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 119-20.
20. IYORI & UESUG1, supra note 2, at 4. During the Meiji rulership, the zaibatsu
acquired property owned by the government. Id. For example, Mitsubishi received the
Nagasaki Dockyard,Japan's largest dockyard, and Mitsui acquired the Miike Coal Mine,
Japan's largest coal mine. Id.
21. Authorities of the Allied Occupation implemented dramatic zaibatsu, land, and
labor reforms in the Japanese economy. TAKAFusA NAKAMuRA, ECONOMic DEVELOPMENT
OF MODERN JAPAN 58 (1985).
22. The concept of an economy based on competition was quite foreign to Japan.
BISSON, supra note 1, at 40-41. Both the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party, the two
major conservative political parties, were historically devoted to the zaibatsu and
monopolistic business practices. Id. The other two main parties, the Social Democrats
and the Communists, also did not support a competitive economy. Id. Thus, forJapan
to be converted to a competitive economy, occupation forces had to institute the
change. Id.
23. HADLEY, supra note 4, at 20.
24. Id.
25. Law for the Elimination of Excessive Concentrations of Economic Power, No.
207 (1947) [hereinafter Deconcentration Act].
26. Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair
Trade, No. 54 (1947) (amended on July 23, 1982) [hereinafter Antimonopoly Act].
27. HADLEY, supra note 4, at 110-11. "[The Deconcentration Act's] broad intention
is to establish a reasonable basis for competition and freedom of enterprise through the
elimination of those concentrations of economic power which stifled efficiency as well
as freedom." (quoting a SCAP release in the Nippon Times, Dec. 18, 1947).
28. HAD.EY, supra note 4, at 110-11. The Deconcentration Act empowered the
HCLC to reorganize excessive concentrations of economic power which were defined
by Article 3 as follows:
any private enterprise conducted for profit, or combination of such enterprises,
which by reason of its relative size in any line or the cumulative power of its
position in many lines, restricts competition or impairs the opportunity for
Vol 27
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anese strongly opposed such measures, but these policies were necessary
to restrict the former Imperial Government's expansionist tendencies and
to substitute a competitive market economy.29
Although the Deconcentration Act provided immediate measures for
dismantling the zaibatsu, the Antimonopoly Act contained the long-term
restrictions on monopolies.3 0 Japan's Antimonopoly Act followed Ameri-
can models-the Sherman Act3 ' and the Clayton Act 32-by prohibiting
the formation or existence of private monopolies and the unreasonable
restraint of trade.3 3 Article 1 of the Antimonopoly Act expresses the Act's
purpose:
This Act, by prohibiting private monopolization, unreasonable restraint of
trade and unfair business practices, by preventing the excessive concentra-
tion of economic power and by eliminating unreasonable restraint of pro-
duction, sale, price, technology, and the like, and all other undue
restriction of business activities through combinations, agreements and
otherwise, aims to promote free and fair competition, to stimulate the initi-
ative of entrepreneurs, to encourage business activities of enterprises, to
heighten the level of employment and people's real income, and thereby to
promote the democratic and wholesome development of the national econ-
omy as well as to assure the interests of consumers in general.3 4
Not surprisingly, the initial enforcement of the Antimonopoly Act cen-
tered on dissolving the power structure of the zaibatsu. Initially, the
Antimonopoly Act strictly outlawed monopolistic activities in the private
sector, but in combination with the Deconcentration Act, it effectively dis-
solved zaibatsu central holding companies.3 5
The Japanese, however, did not readily accept the Antimonopoly Act
since monopolized markets were customary under Japan's Imperial Gov-
ernment.3 6 Even some Americans opposed the Act's perceived rigidity.3 7
In response, Japan's legislature reformed the Antimonopoly Act through
the 1949 Amendment3 8 and the more substantial 1953 Amendment.3 9
others to engage in business independently, in any important segment of
business.
Deconcentration Act, supra note 25, art. 3.
29. H LEY, supra note 4, at 12-14.
30. See Antimonopoly Act, supra note 26.
31. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1990).
32. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1990).
33. See Antimonopoly Act, supra note 26, art. 3.
34. Id. art. 1.
35. IYoRI & UESUGI, supra note 2, at 10. The zaibatsu employed two main forms of
centralized control: central banks and central holding companies (honsha). Central
holding companies were the centers of control within the zaibatsu. They provided
financial services to the subsidiaries, dictated policies of the zaibatsu, and were typically
controlled by the zaibatsu family. BIsSON, supra note 1, at 24-25. Although the
Antimonopoly Act limited the power and influence of both central holding companies
and central banks, only central holding companies were strictly illegal. Antimonopoly
Act, supra note 26, art. 9.
36. HADLEY, supra note 4, at 107.
37. Id.
38. Second Amendment Act to the Antimonopoly Act, No. 214 (1949).
39. Fourth Amendment Act to the Antimonopoly Act, No. 259 (1953).
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The 1949 Amendment to the Antimonopoly Act relaxed restrictions on
interlocking directorates and intercorporate shareholding, both of which
were used by the former zaibatsu to maintain control within their groups.40
The 1949 Amendment, however, retained a level of restriction significantly
greater than accepted levels in the United States. 41 As a consequence, the
1953 Amendment further relaxed the Antimonopoly Act by allowing
exceptions for depression and rationalization cartels,42 repealing prohibi-
tions on the establishment of control organizations and particular con-
certed activities,4 3 and deleting restrictions on unjustified substantial
differences in economic power and debenture holding.44 The combina-
tion of these two amendments significantly weakened the Antimonopoly
Act and created the opportunity for the former zaibatsu companies to reu-
nite and transform into the present day keiretsu.4 5
Although the SCAP had divided the zaibatsu into numerous smaller
companies, made holding companies illegal, and replaced zaibatsu upper
management with middle level managers, the fact remained that large cor-
porate entities gain significant economic benefits from economies of
scale.4 6 The keiretsu consequently attempted to obtain these benefits by
slowly rebuilding ties with their former zaibatsu group members. 47 They
joined into loose conglomerates based on past and present mutual inter-
ests and formalized these relationships by exchanging directorate mem-
bers and shares of corporate stock.48
Despite the illegality of central holding companies under the
Antimonopoly Act,49 the keiretsu achieved centralized control over compa-
nies within their network through either of two nonmutually exclusive
keiretsu arrangements: central bank keiretsu50 or distribution keiretsu.5 1
The central bank keiretsu formed around significant commercial or city
banks that primarily benefit group members through easily attainable
40. IYoI & UESUG1, supra note 2, at 14.
41. Id. at 14-15.
42. The depression cartels exception allows for the approval of cartels in an indus-
try during economically grievous times. Antimonopoly Act, supra note 26, art. 24-3.
The rationalization cartel exception provides for the allowance of cartels to promote
fledgling industries. Id. art. 24-4. See infra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
43. Under the original Antimonopoly Act, the establishment of a control organiza-
tion was strictly prohibited. IYoRI & UESUGI, supra note 2, at 15-16. This restriction
provided a means for preventing the reformation of zaibatsu. In 1953, however, law
makers believed that such a prohibition was overly broad and therefore repealed it. Id.
44. Restrictions on economic power and debenture holding were originally
intended to inhibit zaibatsu reformation but were deemed overly restrictive in regard to
the Japanese economy of 1953. Id. at 16.
45. Id. at 16-17.
46. BIEDA, supra note 7, at 210.
47. CHICARA HIGASHI & G. PETER LAuTER, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE JAPA-
NESE ECONOMY 50 (1990).
48. Id.
49. Antimonopoly Act, supra note 26, art. 9(1).
50. The central bank form of keiretsu is known as a kinyu keiretsu. BIEDA, supra note
7, at 212.
51. The distribution company form of keiretsu is known as a sangyo keiretsu. Id.
Vol. 27
1994 Keiretsu Distribution System ofJapan
loans, reduced interest rates, and access to a distribution system.5 2 The
banks provide this third benefit through an associated trading company
that focuses on distribution of group member products. 53 The result is a
horizontal grouping of large national firms in diversified markets. 54 Pres-
ently, the six largest central bank keiretsu55 unify over fifty of the hundred
largest corporations injapan, includingJapan's automobile and electron-
ics industries. 56
The second type of keiretsu, the distribution keiretsu, organized around
a substantial company at the center of the keiretsu. This central company is
the primary buyer of subsidiary group member products and provides
access to reduced rate financial services.57 The subsidiaries each compose
part of a vertical distribution chain that spans whole sections of the Japa-
nese economy from manufacturing to retailing.58 In many instances, the
substantial corporation in the distribution keiretsu also holds membership
in a central bank keiretsu in order to secure beneficial financial services for
its subsidiaries.5 9
Through the development of these two keiretsu forms, zaibatsu styled
links from the largest central banks to the smallest subsidiaries reemerged
and provided keiretsu group members with a long-run, exclusionary infra-
structure in which to conduct business. 60 As the keiretsu increasingly reas-
sembled the pieces of the old zaibatsu, political opposition to the keiretsu
increased. In 1977, the Japanese government responded with another
amendment to the Antimonopoly Act.6 1 This Amendment empowered
the Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) to impose a surcharge on
cartels to the extent of illegal profits, to require entrepreneurs in certain
instances to transfer part of their business to restore competition, to
require entrepreneurs to justify parallel price increases, and to restrict
stock holdings of large firms and financial entities.
62
Despite the more restrictive 1977 Amendment, the keiretsu to this day
continue to flourish due to a combination of relaxed restrictions under
the 1949 and 1953 Amendments, liberalized exceptions for depression
and rationalization cartels,63 inadequate enforcement of antimonopoly
52. Id.
53. For example, the Mitsui kinyu keiretsu is formed around the Mitsui bank and
Mitsui Bussan trading company. Id.
54. GERLACH, supra note 6, at 4-5.
55. Listed by size, the six central bank keiretsu are as follows: Mitsubishi, Mitsui,
Sumitomo, Dai-Ichi Kangyo, Fuyo, and Sanwa. Id. at vii.
56. Id.
57. BIEDA, supra note 7, at 212.
58. GERLACH, supra note 6, at 5-6.
59. For example, Toshiba, an electronic products company, is a member of the
Mitsui kinyu keiretsu while also being the main company in its own sangyo keiretsu. Id.
60. GERLACH, supra note 6, at vii.
61. Amendment Act to the Antimonopoly Act, No. 63 (1977).
62. IyoRi & Uasuci, supra note 2, at 29-30.
63. Antimonopoly Act, supra note 26, arts. 24-3, 24-4.
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laws by the JFTC,6 4 and underlying pro-monopoly policies dating back to
the pre-World War II period.6 5 The empirical evidence supports this con-
clusion since the six largest keiretsu control roughly twenty-five percent of
the Japanese economy's total assets, and their positions remain relatively
unchanged from the 1960s. 66 Consequently, the underlying cultural and
economic disposition of Japanese business favors monopolistic
enterprise. 67
H. Cohesive Elements of Keiretsu Behavior Functioning to Restrict
Trade
The keiretsu system forms an almost transparent interlinking of Japanese
companies that unites large sections of the Japanese economy.68 This
internally linked structure, however, necessarily impedes foreign and
domestic trade in Japan. 69 The keiretsu, therefore, restrict trade by the
very means they use to maintain their existence. 70
The keiretsu unify their group members through interlocking director-
ates, presidential councils, group-member shareholding, lending prefer-
ences, few intra-group direct competitors, group-wide projects, and intra-
group trading.7 1 The zaibatsu formerly used both interlocking director-
ates7 2 and group member shareholding7 3 as a means to assure control
over their group members. The original Antimonopoly Act, however,
flatly prohibited competing companies from interlocking directorates and
restricted intercorporate stock holdings to financial institutions.74 Never-
theless, the 1953 Amendment relaxed these restrictions in favor of a new
standard that prohibits interlocking directorates and intercorporate share-
holding only if such activity functions "substantially to restrain competi-
tion in any particular field of trade."75 This relaxed standard allows the
keiretsu to engage in controlling mechanisms similar to their zaibatsu
predecessors.
64. Seichi Yoshikawa, Fair Trade Commission vs. MITI: History of the Conflicts Between
the Antimonopoly Policy and the Industrial Poliy in the Post War Period ofJapan, 15 CASE W.
REs. J. INT'L L. 489 (1983). See infra part III.B.
65. See infra part III.A.
66. GERLACH, supra note 6, at 9-11.
67. Yoshikawa, supra note 64, at 503.
68. HADLEY, supra note 4, at 257.
69. Yamamura & Vandenberg, supra note 8, at 245.
70. Id.
71. GERLACH, supra note 6, at 16.
72. The practice of interlocking directorates existed where a corporate officer in
one group member company would hold one or more similar positions simultaneously
in other group member companies thereby uniting control over those companies.
HADLEY, supra note 4, at 82.
73. The practice of intercorporate shareholding, known as kabushiki mochiai, vested
equity control of group members in the hands of other group members thereby
increasing the power of the collective group over individual corporations. GERLACH,
supra note 6, at 16. Typically, the shareholding was relatively reciprocal. Id. at 18.
74. IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 2, at 12. Even financial companies were prohibited
from holding more than 5% of another company's stock. Id.
75. Antimonopoly Act, supra note 26, arts. 10(1), 13(1).
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In light of the 1953 Amendment, the keiretsu have taken a relatively
conservative stance towards the interlocking of directorates and have
engaged primarily in management interlocks and presidential councils.76
Presidential councils provide a forum for top corporate officers to discuss
business with officers of other keiretsu group members. 77 Management
interlocks are simply collaborations between lower level managers. 78 Both
presidential councils and management interlocks can restrain trade by
providing a forum for collective activity between competitors, but their
potentially legitimate business purposes are likely to satisfy the Antimono-
poly Act.79 Although both of these practices exert less power over group
members than did the zaibatsu, they nonetheless afford the keiretsu a signif-
icant degree of coordination and control within their groups.8 0
Intercorporate shareholding, on the other hand, has remained a
more basic form of control in the keiretsu system.8 ' The keiretsu use inter-
corporate shareholding quite extensively and to nearly the same degree as
their zaibatsu predecessors.8 2 In 1986, for example, members of the six
largest keiretsu groups83 controlled at least 28% of the equity in their fellow
keiretsu group members.8 4 Moreover, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Sumitomo,
the former zaibatsu of the six, retained over 51% of the equity within their
individual keiretsu.8 5 In contrast, the equity ownership across different
keiretsu groups remains relatively insignificant. For example, the Mitsub-
ishi, Sumitomo, Fuji, and DKB keiretsu each held less than 2% of Mitsui
keiretsu stock in 1986 while unconnected entities held 33.7% of Mitsui
stock.86 Keiretsu members thus retain a significant amount of available
equity within their respective groups.
The keiretsu augment and, in most respects, supersede equity control
through debt control. Debt control comes in the form of reduced rate
76. HADLE, supra note 4, at 249.
77. Id. For example, the Mitsui keiretsu has two councils: the Second Thursday con-
ference (Nimoku-Kat) and the Monday conference (Getsuyo-KaO. Japan's Keiretsu System:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1991) [hereinafter
Japan's Keiretsu System]. The Second Thursday conference is attended by the presidents
and chairmen of 24 Mitsui companies. Id. The Monday conference is attended by the
directors of 75 Mitsui companies. Id.
78. HADLEY, supra note 4, at 250.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 249. It is also important to note that membership in a presidential council
is usually mutually exclusive. GERLACH, supra note 6, at 12. For example, in 1982 there
were only four companies that were members of multiple councils out of 187 total
memberships. Id.
81. HADLEY, supra note 4, at 212.
82. Japan's Keiretsu System, supra note 77, at 83-84.
83. The six largest keiretsu are Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuji, Sanwa, and DKB.
GERLAcH, supra note 6, at 18.
84. Id.
85. In 1986, the percentages of equity ownership held by members within the
keiretsu were 51.4% for Mitsui, 63.4% for Mitsubishi, 63.9% for Sumitomo, 38.1% for
Fuji, 28.0% for Sanwa, and 31.6% for DKB. Id.
86. Id.
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loans issued through a keiretsu central bank or trading company.8 7 Typi-
cally, banks provide loans for the keiretsu companies and look after finan-
cial interests while the companies utilize the banking services provided by
the keiretsw88 Since most companies rely far more heavily on debt financ-
ing over equity financing, the debt relationship between central banks and
subsidiary companies provides a significant, if not the primary, means of
control within the keiretsu.89
Allocation controls are also used in the keiretsu system.90 A primary
example of an allocation control is the "one-set principle,"9 1 which
denotes the horizontal keiretsu's behavior of having only one vertical group
of member companies per major industry.9 2 Of the six largest keiretsu,
each is diversified into several product lines with only an insignificant
amount of overlap within any individual keiretsu.93 Consequently, the
keiretsu experience relatively little competition from associated group
members. 94 Allocation controls, therefore, promote cohesion and simu-
late the atmosphere of one united company.
The keiretsu also reinforce their control over group members through
group-wide projects involving many different group companies. 95 Since
the late 1950s, the use of group-wide projects has steadily increased among
the keiretsu.96 These projects encourage cohesion and assert the interests
of the keiretsu,97 while also providing the keiretsu with a means for ventur-
ing into new fields.98 Group-wide projects thus aid the keiretsu in accom-
plishing two goals-group unity and keiretsu expansion-which explains
their increasing use.9 9
Despite the various means of control within the keiretsu, intra-group
trading remains the largest concern for outsiders attempting to trade in
Japanese markets.' 00 Intra-group trading is a natural result of the afore-
mentioned cohesive mechanisms. 10 1 Defenders of keiretsu behavior assert
87. HADLEY, supra note 4, at 219. The 1953 Amendment repealed the Antimono-
poly Act's restriction on debenture holding which allowed debt control to reemerge as
a form of keiretsu control. Ivowu & UESuci, supra note 2, at 16.
88. With rare exception, the centralized city bank was the primary bank for group
member companies in the six largest horizontal keiretsu. GERLACH, supra note 6, at 16.
89. HADLEY, supra note 4, at 219-20.
90. GERLACH, supra note 6, at 12.
91. This "one-set principle" (wan setto-shugi) is more strongly adhered to by former
zaibatsu (i.e., Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Sumitomo). Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 13. See also YusAKu F1JTATSUGI, ENTERPRISE GROUPS IN CONTEMPORARY
JAPAN: FOCUSING ON AN ANALSiS OF LARGE FiRms 64 (1976) (in Japanese).
96. GERLACH, supra note 6, at 13.
97. Id. The keiretsu even utilize group-wide projects in the social context in addition
to the business context. Id. at 15. In the extreme, the keiretsu promote marriages
between employees of different keiretsu group members to facilitate cohesion. Id.
98. Id. at 13.
99. Id. At 12-15.
100. Yamamura & Vandenberg, supra note 8, at 243-47.
101. Id.
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that the keiretsu transact only about 10% of their business with other mem-
bers in the keiretsu.'0 2 To some degree, however, this figure underesti-
mates the extent of intra-group trading. The Japanese Fair Trade
Commission's definition of affiliation trading, on which the 10% figure is
based, takes a narrow interpretation of affiliation and thereby excludes
relevant intra-group transactions' 0 3 such as transactions between vertical
suppliers and distributors that do not rely on a trading company for distri-
butional sales. 10 4 After adding these transactions to the definition of affili-
ation trading, the percentage of intra-group trading rises to roughly 30%
of total transactions by keiretsu groups.' 0 5 This revised percentage is signif-
icant considering that the six largest keiretsu control roughly 25% of the
total assets in the Japanese economy.' 0 6 At the very least, such exclusion-
ary trading, in combination with the aforementioned cohesive elements of
keiretsu behavior, makes the keiretsu formidable competitors in most Japa-
nese markets. More plausibly, however, the keiretsu impede competitive
trade and operate in violation of Japan's Antimonopoly Act.' 0 7
m. The Japanese Government's Response to Keiretsu Behavior
With the development of a world economy and the growth ofJapan into a
world economic power, the exclusionary business practices of the Japanese
have increasingly been called into question. Challenges to these practices
have ranged from changing economic sentiment within Japan itself to
high level trade negotiations initiated by other nations. These negotia-
tions include the United States-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative' 0 8
and the Clinton administration's bilateral trade negotiation framework. 10 9
Japan's seemingly inadequate response to these negotiations is due to con-
flicting forces within the Japanese government and economy, but the
underlying conflict is one of policy. 10 The two conflicting policies are the
politically favored industrial policy, which encourages monopolistic mar-
kets, and the antimonopoly policy, which promotes competitive
102. GERLACH, supra note 6, at 19.
103. Id.
104. Kozo Yamamura, WillI Japan's Economic Structure Change? Confessions of a Former
Optimis; inJAPAN's ECONOMIC STRucruPE: SHOULD IT CHANGE? 13, 31 (Kozo Yamamura
ed., 1990). Trading company transactions with group members account for 11.5% of
total purchases and 4.6% of total sales of the keiretsu. HGASHI & LAUTER, supra note 47,
at 51. Manufacturing company transactions with group members, however, account for
12.4% of total purchases and 20.4% of total sales of the keiretsu. Id.
105. Hiroshi Okumura, Seito-ka Dekinai Keiretsu' no Gorisei [The Unjustified Rationality
of the 'Keiretsu'], EKONOMIStrro, July 10, 1990, at 78-89.
106. GERLACH, supra note 6, at 9-12.
107. See Antimonopoly Act, supra note 26.
108. See Yoshikawa, supra note 64, at 489.
109. White House Reacts Warmly to New Hosokawa Government, KYODO NEws, Aug. 6,
1993, available in WESTLAWJAPANECON database [hereinafter New Hosokawa Govern-
ment]. See infra part IV.
110. Yoshikawa, supra note 64, at 489.
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markets."1
A. Japanese Industrial Policy and the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI)
The Japanese industrial policy, a product of the Meiji restoration period,
refers to the "planning required for optimum growth in the Japanese
economy."112 This policy evolved from the combination ofJapan's unique
economic situation 1 3 and its culture. 1 4 The policy focused on maximiz-
ing the population's real income by allocating scarce resources to the sec-
tors of the economy that could use the resources most productively.' 1
5
The result was a dramatic increase in Japan's competitive advantage in the
area of international trade and a historical policy supporting keiretsu
behavior.116
The primary governmental entity effectuating Japan's industrial pol-
icy is the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).117 MITI is
one of two governmental ministries that leads, directs, and advises the
business sector.118 MITI implements the industrial policy through its "reg-
ulation of production and distribution of goods and services." 1 9 From
the outset, MITI's policy directives fundamentally conflicted with Japan's
antimonopoly policy and the directives of the Japanese Fair Trade Com-
111. Id. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry is considered one of the
Japanese government's most prestigious and powerful ministries, equaled only by the
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Japan Trade Concessions: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 137 (1992).
112. DANIEL METRAux, THE JAPANESE ECONOMY AND THE AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN 89
(1989).
113. As a country with few agricultural prospects, Japan turned to industrialization
during the Meji restoration in 1868. MIYOHEI SHINOHARA, INDUSTRIAL GROWTH, TRADE,
AND Di'Amic PATTERNS IN THEJAPANESE ECONOMY 23 (1982). Japan ceased its economic
isolation from world trade and began to encourage economic and financial concentra-
tion in industry. Id. The Japanese viewed such concentration as economically sound
and beneficial to Japan on the whole. Id. The result was large trading conglomerates-
the zaibatsu. Id. After World War II, the war-ravaged industrial sector ofJapan was in
disarray, but MITI, in keeping with past policies, resumed "relentless concentration on
... industrial growth" despite the existence of antimonopoly laws and policy. ALLEN,
supra note 15, at 86.
114. The industrial policy grew out of the very close relationship between business
and government inJapanese culture. MErRAux, supra note 112, at 86-89. TheJapanese
people traditionally viewed the nation as one extended family, and therefore both busi-
ness and government were united as part of a "family." Id. This expansive view of
family was derived from a fundamental duty of loyalty to one's lord as espoused by
Confucius. Id. As a result, loyalty to the national family united government and busi-
ness in a complimentary relationship. Id.
115. The Japanese, in essence, take an economic approach to allocative efficiency.
Id. at 89-91. Instead of producing a wide range of products, they focus their resources
on industries in which they can produce quality, competitive goods. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 93. There are six special responsibilities of MITI: supervising Japan's
international trade; smoothing the flow of goods inJapan's economy; promoting manu-
facturing, mining, and distribution; assuring a steady supply of resources; administering
small business policies; and promoting and guiding small business growth. Id.
118. The other ministry is the Ministry of Finance (MOF). Id. at 92.
119. Id. at 93.
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mission (JFTC).120 For example, in 1952 the price of cotton began to
drop, and MITI responded by limiting the output of each cotton mill to
150,000 bales per month.' 2 ' MITI enforced the restriction on output by
threatening to reduce the amount of imported cotton to be allocated to
the noncomplying mill. 122 This action resulted in a cartel that furthered
the objectives of the Japanese industrial policy at the expense of competi-
tion in the marketplace and violated the antimonopoly policy.
MITI's primary objective is to implement the industrial policy, and in
so doing, MITI utilizes its power of "administrative guidance."' 23 This gui-
dance typically aids corporations in failing industries and entails analyzing
a corporation's business situation and suggesting a remedy.124 Although
administrative guidance is relatively informal in nature and lacks direct
statutory authority, MITI uses it as a powerful internal mechanism to bring
failing businesses in line with Japanese industrial policy.12 5
Through the administrative guidance of MITI andJapan's dedication
to its industrial policy, the keiretsu have drawn support in opposition to the
antimonopoly policy. In addition, MITI's power to exempt companies
from the application of the Antimonopoly Act,12 6 the widespread political
support for the industrial policy from the Japanese people, 127 and MITI's
implicit veto power over the actions of the JFTC each lend support to the
keiretsu.12 8 As a result, the keiretsu thrive in a favorable environment that
not only tolerates keiretsu behavior but also encourages it.129
B. Antimonopoly Policy and the Japanese Fair Trade Commission
The keiretsu are supported by the Japanese industrial policy, but their exist-
ence is strengthened by the weaknesses of Japan's antimonopoly policy
and the Japanese Fair Trade Commission C-FTC). 130 The antimonopoly
policy, an import of American economic values, has never meshed with
Japanese culture for several reasons.13 1 First, the establishment of cartels
in the Japanese economy dates back to the nineteenth century and is con-
120. The MITI promotes the concentration of resources which violates, at the very
least, the purpose of the Antimonopoly Act. See supra Section I.
121. Yoshikawa, supra note 64, at 494.
122. Id.
123. Toghiaki Nakazawa & Leonard W. Weiss, The Legal Cartels ofJapan, 34 A'rrrrauST
BULL. 642 (1989). Administrative guidance or gyosei shido "involves the use of influence,
prestige, advice, and persuasion to encourage both corporations and individuals to
work in particular directions that the government sees desirable." METRAux, supra note
112, at 94. It is also much more than the "carrot and stick" approach. Id. It is a tradi-
tion of government working together with business toward a common goal. Id.
124. Nakazawa & Weiss, supra note 123, at 642.
125. ELLIOTrJ. HAHN, JAPANESE BUSINESS LAw AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 131-43 (1984).
126. HADLEY, supra note 4, at 376; Iyoiu & UESUGI, supra note 2, at 19.
127. METRAux, supra note 112, at 86-89.
128. Yoshikawa, supra note 64, at 503.
129. METRAUX, supra note 112, at 86-89.
130. Yoshikawa, supra note 64, at 495.
131. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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sequently ingrained in Japanese culture.' 3 2 Second, the Japanese prefer
cooperation over competition, which directly contradicts the basic prem-
ise behind Japan's antimonopoly policy.' 3 3 In their view, collaboration
with a business competitor to achieve a common goal is not criminal in
nature. Third, the Japanese business culture supports lifetime service to,
and employment by, one corporation, which dramatically reduces the
mobility of the work force.' 34 Consequently, the bankruptcy of ajapanese
corporation is relatively severe for the company's employees and results in
the need for a supportive infrastructure as found in the keiretsu system. l3 5
This established business system, therefore, works against the enforcement
of Japan's antimonopoly policy and provides a far greater obstacle to
enforcement than do mere individual offenders.
Enforcement of the Japanese antimonopoly policy also suffers due to
the weakness of the Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), the agency
entrusted with enforcing this policy.136 In particular, the method used to
appoint JFTC Commissioners and staff significantly biases the JFTC
against stringent enforcement of the antimonopoly policy.' 3 7 For the
most part, JFTC Commissioners have not been lawyers, judges, or law
professors since the early 1950s. 138 Instead, Commissioners were
appointed from opposing governmental ministries such as the Ministry of
Finance (MOF) and MITI.' 39 Of the five Commissioner positions, includ-
ing the chairman, officials from MITI, MOF, and the Ministry of Justice
customarily fill three of these positions, 140 while members of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs or the Bank ofJapan typically account for the remaining
two positions.' 4 ' These leaders of the JFTC tend to bring strong biases
from their former ministry positions that favor Japan's industrial policy
and impede the enforcement of antimonopoly legislation. As a result, the
JFTC is unlikely to adequately enforce Japan's antimonopoly policy against
the powerful and politically supported keiretsu.
Political opposition to the JFTC from organized industry and the
bureaucracy further inhibits enforcement of the antimonopoly policy.' 42
In contrast, MITI and other opponents of the JFTC have traditionally
received strong support from the Liberal Democratic Party, Japan's ruling
132. The first cartel was the Paper Manufacturing Federation formed in 1880. Iyomi
& UEsucI, supra note 2, at 2.
133. Yoshikawa, supra note 64, at 495.
134. Id. at 496.
135. Id.
136. Antimonopoly Act, supra note 26, art. 27(1).
137. Yoshikawa, supra note 64, at 497.
138. Id.
139. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) is the business sector's counterpart to MITI.
MOF is responsible for the monetary and financial policies of the Japanese economy
that include the national budget. MOF also effectuates the Japanese industrial policy.
MErAux, supra note 112, at 92-93.
140. Yoshikawa, supra note 64, at 497.
141. Id.
142. A=LN, supra note 15, at 42.
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party since the post-war occupation.' 43 The Liberal Democratic Party's
thirty-eight year rule ended, however, with Morihiro Hosokawa's election
as Prime Minister of Japan in August 1993. 44 Hosokawa was the candi-
date from a seven-party coalition, but his term in office was cut short when
he resigned amid allegations of financial scandal. On April 28, 1994,
Tsutomu Hata succeeded Hosokawa as the new prime minister and coali-
tion leader. Whether Hata's election will lead to a strongerJFTC andJap-
anese antimonopoly policy remains uncertain, but the change of political
parties in Japan may signal wavering support for MITI and the Japanese
industrial policy. The United States, nevertheless, does not expect a dra-
matic change in Japan's traditional policies.' 45
C. Recession, Rationalization, and Other Cartels That Enhance Keiretsu
Behavior
During the rule of the Liberal Democratic Party, theJFTC also acted in its
own way to support keiretsu behavior through its power to authorize special
cartels. 146 The 1953 Amendment empowered the JFTC to exempt indus-
tries from application of the Antimonopoly Act based on the presence of
certain economic conditions in the industries.147 This amendment
authorized theJFTC to exempt both depression and rationalization cartels
as well as other cartels under so called "bypass statutes." 148
The JFJ7C may exempt depression cartels if "there exists an extreme
disequilibrium of supply and demand for a particular commodity." 149 To
qualify for exemption, the commodity's price must be below the average
cost of production and a considerable portion of the producers must be in
jeopardy of being forced out of business.' 5 0 In such a situation, theJFTC
may approve an exemption to alleviate the harmful effects of excessive
competition. 151
143. Yoshikawa, supra note 64, at 496. For example, in 1968 the JFTC refused to
allow a merger between Yawata Steel and Fuji Steel. Id. In response, the Liberal Demo-
cratic Party threatened to "reorganize" theJFTC Commission on constitutional grounds
and in the end theJFTC yielded to the pressure. Id. at 496-97. The Liberal Democratic
Party's threat of "reorganization" was based on an alleged violation of Article 65 of the
Japanese Constitution. Id. Article 65 mandates that the Cabinet shall have all executive
power. Id. Since the Antimonopoly Law (Article 28) grants the JFTC power independ-
ent from the Cabinet, the Liberal Democratic Party asserted that the JFTC violated
Article 65 and could be reorganized on that basis. Id.
144. New Hosokawa Government, supra note 109.
145. See generally U.S. Defers Decision on Trade Steps Against Japan, KYODo NEws, May 1,
1994, available in WESTLAW, JAPANECON database.
146. The definition of "cartel" includes all "concerted activity" of entrepreneurs to
restrain production, sales, or price of a commodity. See generally Antimonopoly Act,
supra note 26, arts. 24-3, 24-4.
147. Iow & UEsuci, supra note 2, at 15-16.
148. Antimonopoly Act, supra note 26, arts. 24-3, 24-4. Yoshikawa, supra note 64, at
492.
149. Antimonopoly Act, supra note 26, art. 24-3(1).
150. Id.
151. Id.
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In addition, the JFrC may approve rationalization cartels "where they
are particularly necessary for effecting an advancement of technology, an
improvement in the quality of goods, a reduction in costs, an increase in
efficiency and other rationalization of enterprises." 15 2 These exempted
cartels are meant to further industry and to reflect the underlying indus-
trial policy ofJapan. In other words, the exemption demonstrates the Jap-
anese belief that cooperation supersedes competition and that
cooperation serves to promote innovation better than competition. 153
In addition to exemptions for depression and rationalization cartels,
individual statutes, known as "bypass statutes," allow more exceptions to
antimonopoly laws. 15 4 These statutes derive support from the business
community and MITI as a means for advancing the industrial policy.155
These exemptions extend to enterprises of small and medium size, to gov-
ernmentally regulated businesses, and to import and export
enterprises. 156
The exemptions for depression, rationalization, and "bypass statute"
cartels codify a broader range of exceptions than those found in American
antitrust law.15 7 In 1963, for example, empirical data showed that legal
cartels accounted for about 28% of Japanese exports of manufactured
goods. 158 Although this percentage subsequently dropped to around
10%, these percentages ignore the possible rise in illegal cartels. 159 Legal-
ized cartel exemptions, nevertheless, allow a significant number of indus-
tries to conduct business without antimonopoly barriers. 160 Through
approval of legalized cartels, the JFTC furthers monopolistic activity that
would be illegal under American standards, and the keiretsu experience a
favorable environment for their monopolistic behavior.' 16 Whether this
favorable environment will change under the Hata administration remains
to be seen and will undoubtedly depend upon negotiations with foreign
nations, particularly the United States. 162
152. Id. art. 24-4(1).
153. METRAux, supra note 112, at 83-86, 89.
154. Yoshikawa, supra note 64, at 492.
155. Id.
156. Id. Two of the primary exemption statutes have been the Stabilization of Spe-
cific Small and Medium Enterprise Temporary Measures Act, which allowed depression
cartels for certain small businesses, and the Export Trading Act, which authorized
export cartels. Ivo~i & Usumi, supra note 2, at 19.
157. lyori Hiroshi, Antitrust and Industrial Policy in Japan: Competition and Cooperation,
in LAW AND TRADE IssuEs OF THE JAPANESE ECONoMY 56, 66 (Gary Saxonhouse & Kozo
Yamamura eds., 1986).
158. Nakazawa & Weiss, supra note 123, at 643.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See New Hosokawa Government, supra note 109.
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IV. Bilateral Trade Negotiations and Super 301-International
Challenges to Keiretsu Power
In 1989, the United States faced a mounting trade deficit, most of which
was owed to Jalan, and complex nontariff barriers to U.S. products enter-
ingJapanese markets. 163 The Bush Administration, in an effort to open
Japanese markets and reduce the trade deficit, launched the United
States-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) on May 25, 1989.164
Under this initiative, U.S. negotiators "aimed at addressing the underlying
structural barriers to balance of payments adjustment and promoting
more efficient, open, and competitive markets in Japan and the United
States."165 According to Senator Max Baucus, Chairman of the Senate
Subcommittee on International Trade, negotiators identified the keiretsu
as a significant structural impediment to U.S. trade in Japan. Conse-
quently, the United States challenged the keiretsu under SII. 166
The United States asserted that keiretsu relationships must be made
"more open and transparent" regarding intercorporate shareholding,
directorate practices, and other anticompetitive behavior.167 Japan for-
mally agreed with the fundamental U.S. position and committed itself to
examine, and revise where necessary, its governmental policies regarding
anticompetitive practices of the keiretsu.168 Japan later reaffirmed formal
commitments to monitor the six major keiretsu groups through the Japa-
nese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) to take required measures for making
the keiretsu "more open and transparent," to expand the scope of corpo-
rate disclosure, and to improve shareholder's rights.1 69 Despite this
signed agreement, enforcement of these policies has lagged far behind
Japan's formal assurances to the United States.' 70
In evaluatingJapanese progress under SII, Senator Baucus asserted in
1992 that SII failed to address the keiretsu problem.17 ' He stated: "We
don't need another meaningless negotiation followed by another declara-
tion of victory."172 Senator Baucus believed we should reinstate the Super
301 provision of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act.173
163. Yamamura & Vandenberg, supra note 8, at 245.
164. United States-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative; supra note 10, at 1.
165. Full Text of U.S. Comments on Japanese Reports on SI-1, Kvono NEws, May 22, 1991,
at 1, available in WESTLAW, JAPANECON database [hereinafterJapanese Reports].
166. United States-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative, supra note 10, at 2.
167. Japanese Reports, supra note 165, at 3.
168. Phase II, supra note 3, at 1. According to a Hong Kong business association
president, "it's all right in [Japanese] culture to lie to a foreigner," and thus the United
States should continue pressing Japan to fulfill its commitments. Id. at 4.
169. Highlights of SII Report on Japan's Commitments, KYODO NEvs, July 30, 1992, avail-
able in WESTLAW, JAPANECON database.
170. Phase II, supra note 3.
171. Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) Review: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-
national Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5 (1992).
172. Id.
173. Id.; Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§ 1301, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 1164-68 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 2411).
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Super 301 expired in 1990 after a two year reinstatement. 174 While in
effect, Super 301 required the United States Trade Representativeto iden-
tify major foreign trade barriers and distortion practices, to enter negotia-
tions in an attempt to alleviate those restraints on trade, and if
negotiations failed, to initiate sanctions equal to the restraint's cost to the
United States. 175 Super 301, during its two year viability, effectively
opened markets in Japan and other countries for U.S. satellites, forest
products, supercomputers, agricultural products, and other commodi-
ties. 176 The Bush Administration, however, remained committed to SII
negotiations as a superior means of securing Japanese concessions and
subsequent action. 177
After President Clinton's election in 1992, he reaffirmed his support
for the policy of pressingJapan to open markets through continuing nego-
tiations. 178 Initially, however, President Clinton did not come out in full
support of Super 301.179 Instead, the President's top economic advisor,
Laura Tyson, suggested that bilateral negotiations for individual product
markets might be initiated, specifically citing the keiretsu dilemma as an
issue to be addressed. 180 According to Tyson, the best policy was a "multi-
track approach," uniting sectoral negotiations with existing multilateral
efforts.18 1
During 1993, trade negotiations continued with Japan, but the frame-
work for negotiation changed to a "results-oriented" approach. In July of
1993, President Clinton and then Prime Minister of Japan, Kiichi
Miyazawa, agreed to a new framework for bilateral trade negotiations.18 2
Under this agreement, trade negotiations will focus on sectoral and struc-
tural barriers to trade between the two countries, which includes the
keiretsu. Japan and the United States will subsequently evaluate the effec-
tiveness of "measures and policies taken in each sectoral and structural
area based on 'sets of objective criteria, either qualitative or quantitative or
both."" 83
According to U.S. Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen, the agreement
utilizes "quantitative benchmarks" to achieve specific trade results and
provides for "sector-by-sector" accords. 184 The Miyazawa Administration,
however, asserted that Japan only agreed to a standard of "tangible pro-
174. Structural Impediments Initiative (S11) Review, supra note 171.
175. 139 CONG. REc. S1506 (1993).
176. 139 CONG. REc. S1030 (1993).
177. Id.
178. U.S. to Keep Pressing Japan on Opening Markets, KyoDo NEws, Feb. 1, 1993, avail-
able in WESTLAW, JAPANECON database.
179. 139 CONG. REc., supra note 176, at S1030.
180. Highlights of SII Report on Japan's Commitments, supra note 169.
181. Id.
182. Japan, U.S. Agree on Numerical Benchmarks, Bentsen Says, KYODo NEws, available in
WESTLAW, JAPANECON database.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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gress" and refused to accept specific target criteria.185 Japanese officials
also stressed that the agreement on "objective criteria" was not binding
and would not subject Japan to sanctions if measurable targets were not
achieved.' 8 6 Although bilateral trade negotiations continue with Japan,
according to Joan Spero, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Economic, Busi-
ness and Cultural Affairs, "progress to date has been disappointing."18 7
In March 1994, President Clinton responded to the slow progress by
issuing an executive order reinstating the Super 301 trade measure. 18 8
According to U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, the reinstatement
of Super 301 is not targeted at any country in particular and will not lead
to immediate 'sanctions.' 8 9 The newly revived trade measure does not
even require the U.S. Trade Representative to specify targeted countries
until September 30, 1994, which is six months after the disclosure of the
annual National Trade Estimate report.'9 0 At that time, however, the
Trade Representative will identify "priority foreign country practices"
which if eliminated would provide the greatest potential for U.S. exports
to expand.19 1 Twenty-one days after identifying a country's practices, the
United States will attempt to negotiate a sufficient reduction or elimina-
tion of these identified trade practices over a twelve to eighteen month
period.19 2 Only after the failure of these negotiations will sanctions be
imposed.193
As expected, President Clinton's reinstatement of Super 301 incited
protests from the Hosokawa administration. 9 4 Prior to Super 301's revi-
val, Japan expressed a willingness to contain the Clinton administration's
inclination to revive Super 301 for retaliation purposes' 9 5 and also reaf-
firmed its rejection of U.S. demands for setting specific target levels on
trade. 19 6 After the reinstatement, Japan challenged Super 301 as discor-
dant with dispute settlement rules of the soon to be established World
Trade Organization (WTO).197 Japan further emphasized that the United
185. Hosokawa, Clinton May Meet Around September 27 in New York, KYODO NEws, Aug.
11, 1993, available in WESTLAW, JAPANECON database.
186. Japan, U.S. Agree on Numerical Benchmarks, Bentsen Says, supra note 182.
187. Senior U.S. Official Blasts Tokyo for Slow Trade Action, supra note 3.
188. U.S. Reinstates Super 301 Trade Weapon, KYODO Novs, Mar. 3, 1994, available in
WESTLAW, JAPANECON database. Senator Max Baucus praised the reinstatement as
sending "a clear message to japan-negotiate with good faith, open your market or face
sanctions." Congress Hails Clinton's Super 301 Decision, KYODo NEws, Mar. 3, 1994, avail-
able in WESTLAW, JAPANECON database.
189. U.S. Reinstates Super 301 Trade Weapon, supra note 188.
190. U.S. Statement on Executive Order Reinstating Super 301, KYODo Navs, Mar. 3, 1994,
available in WESTLAW, JAPANECON database.
191. US. Reinstates Super 301 Trade Weapon, supra note 188.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Japan's Statement on Super 301, KYODo NEws, Mar. 4, 1994, available in
WESTLAW, JAPANECON database.
195. Hosokawa Willing to Stop U.S. Threat of Trade Sanctions, KYODo NEws, Jan. 12,
1994, available in WESTLAW, JAPANECON database.
196. Id.
197. Japan's Statement on Super 301, supra note 194.
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States should proceed in a "sensible manner" and should realize the neces-
sity of a "restrained response." 19 8 The Hosokawa administration, however,
did reconfirm Japan's intent to implement voluntary measures that would
increase access to Japanese markets.' 9 9
Whether President Clinton's multitrack approach, complimented by
the reinstatement of Super 301, will provide an effective means of sup-
pressing keiretsu activities remains to be seen. Nevertheless, it is clear that
keiretsu behavior must be reduced to equalize the trade imbalance between
the United States and Japan. In this regard, the United States-Japan bilat-
eral trade agreement offers no guarantees that the keiretsu will be affected,
but the agreement's focus on tangible results suggests that the Japanese
may now be more willing to take action than in the past.
V. Suggested Actions to Remedy the Keiretsu Dilemma
The keiretsu remain strong despite the increasing power of the Japanese
Fair Trade Commission and Japan's antimonopoly policy.200 Additional
foreign pressure and internal change is necessary to address the funda-
mental problem-the dominance of the Japanese industrial policy which
encourages keiretsu behavior. To remedy this problem, Japan must largely
abandon its industrial policy and strengthen its antimonopoly policy in
order to bring Japanese business practices in line with international
norms.
Negotiations between Japan and the United States should continue
through a multitrack approach that focuses on alleviating structural
impediments to international trade. Sectoral negotiations should compli-
ment these talks by reducing nontariff barriers in difficult markets' For
example, U.S. negotiators should negotiate specific bilateral treaties to
suppress keiretsu activities in certain industries such as the automotive
industry, which accounts for 70% of Japan's roughly $49 billion surplus
with the United States. 201 Not surprisingly, the keiretsu dominate the Japa-
nese automotive industry and act as a significant barrier to foreign auto-
motive products entering Japan.20 2 Strong bilateral agreements covering
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. IvoRi & Uusucr, supra note 2, at 20-21.
201. Japan Trade Concessions: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, supra note
111, at 76. Micheline Maynard, Poling Talks Tough on Trade, USA TODAY, Feb. 24, 1993,
at 2B.
202. The 1990 U.S. automotive trade deficit with Japan was $31.1 billion which
accounted for 76% of the U.S. deficit with Japan and 28% of the overall U.S. deficit.
Oversight of U.S. Trade Policy with Japan: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Govern-
ment Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 158
(1991). In 1989, U.S. auto parts companies exported $638 million in auto parts to
Japan; however, Japanese companies exported approximately $11 billion in auto parts
to the United States. FIC and International Antitrust Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
the Consumer of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 92-93 (1990). Furthermore, there is concern that as Japanese auto makers pro-
duce more vehicles in the United States the keiretsu behavior will be replicated in the
United States as well. Id.
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automotive parts and other difficult markets, therefore, would be highly
beneficial in openingJapanese markets. 203 The United States-Japan bilat-
eral trade negotiation framework should provide an appropriate forum
for generating these bilateral agreements without abandoning concern for
generalized structural challenges.
Although the Structural Impediments Initiative and the Clinton
administration's bilateral trade negotiation framework have motivated the
discourse of change, the reinstatement of the Super 301 provision should
focus necessary pressure against the keiretsu and should achieve tangible
results.20 4 Formerly, during Super 301's two-year viability, the United
States successfully used the measure to pressure foreign nations into open-
ing their markets to U.S. goods and services.20 5 Additional successes
should occur under Super 301's present reinstatement provided the
United States does not allow the flexibility of Super 301 to undermine the
provision's effectiveness.2 0 6 To avoid impairing Super 301, the United
States should remain committed to imposing sanctions if negotiations fail
and should negotiate for actual results, not mere promises. If used cor-
rectly, Super 301 should add sufficient pressure to secure needed action
within an appropriate time frame.20
7
Although Japan has already committed itself to suppressing keiretsu
behavior, it must now take action-action that throughout history it has
been unwilling to take.20 8 In general, the United States should pressure
Japan to effectuate business competition and not policy competition. Spe-
cifically, the United States should press the Hata administration to reduce
Japan's exceptions for legalized cartels, to enforce a stronger antimono-
poly policy, and to allocate more power to the JFTC to keep the industrial
policy and MITI in check. The United States should also encourage the
Japanese to realize the importance of Japan's role as the second largest
economic power in the world today, to suppress Japan's heightened
export orientation, and to divide the keiretsu into competitive companies.
Without these measures, the keiretsu will continue to exist in violation of
Japan's antimonopoly policy, and they will continue to suppress foreign
trade in Japanese markets.
Conclusion
By American standards, Japan has failed to effectuate its antimonopoly
policy and the keiretsu illustrate this failure. The keiretsu are transparent
networks of companies that maintain their collectivity through exclusion-
ary trade practices, exclusive financing arrangements, few intra-group
direct competitors, one group member per major industry, group-wide
203. See generally Oversight of U.S. Trade Polity with Japan, supra note 202, at 154-283.
204. See generally 139 CONG. REC., supra note 175, at S1503.
205. 139 CONG. REc., supra note 176, at S1030.
206. See U.S. Statement on Executive Order Reinstating Super 301, supra note 190.
207. Id. See also Baucus Says Executive Order May Revive 'Super 301, 'KvoDo Nuws, Nov.
23, 1993, available in WESTLAW, JAPANECON database.
208. See supra part III.
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projects, intercorporate shareholding, presidential councils, and interlock-
ing directorates. Although these practices suggest antitrust violations, the
keiretsu receive strong support from Japan's underlying industrial policy,
the powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and an ineffec-
tive Japanese Fair Trade Commission.
Throughout Japanese history, Japan has encouraged and even ideal-
ized the methods and motivations of the keiretsu.209 Keiretsu behavior car-
ried the Japanese economy from the devastation of World War II to the
second most powerful economy in the world today. Yet, despite the suc-
cess of the keiretsu, they contradict not only Japanese national laws and
policy, but international notions of commercial fairness as well. On these
grounds, the United States challenged the keiretsu through the Structural
Impediments Initiative and the Clinton administration's bilateral trade
framework. Although these negotiations have succeeded in securing some
concessions, Japan remains unwilling to take significant action to suppress
nontariff trade barriers like the keiretsu. If this inaction continues, the
United States should invoke sanctions against Japan through the newly
reinstated Super 301 provision despite Japan's apparent readiness to
counter such a measure.
In weighing its options, Japan should heavily consider its responsibili-
ties as the world's second largest economic power and it should realize
that international trading practices are premised on fundamental notions
of fairness. 2 10 Due to Japan's status in international trade, it is imperative
that Japan deal fairly with its international trading partners. To achieve
fairness, Japan should seek to promote and maintain a competitive econ-
omy that does not unreasonably restrain either foreign or domestic trade
in Japanese markets. Simply stated, Japan must learn to wield its immense
economic power responsibly and in accord with international standards.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 126-29.
210. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 5 and 6,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [GAT]. Although the GATT" does not specifically
apply to structural impediments such as the keiretsu, it does provide the primary frame-
work for international trade. U.S. Sees Its Trade Laws Protected by GA7T Accord, KYODO
NEws, Dec. 14, 1993, available in WESTLAW, JAPANECON database.
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